Abstract. The appearance of a Brownian term in the price dynamics on a stock market was interpreted in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003) ] as a consequence of the informational asymmetries between agents. To take benefit of their private information without revealing it to fast, the informed agents have to introduce a noise on their actions, and all these noises introduced in the day after day transactions for strategic reasons will aggregate in a Brownian Motion. We prove in the present paper that this kind of argument leads not only to the appearance of the Brownian motion, but it also narrows the class of the price dynamics: the price process will be, as defined in this paper, a continuous martingale of maximal variation. This class of dynamics contains in particular Black and Scholes' as well as Bachelier's dynamics. The main result in this paper is that this class is quite universal and independent of a particular model: the informed agent can choose the speed of revelation of his private information. He determines in this way the posterior martingale L, where Lq is the expected value of an asset at stage q given the information of the uninformed agents. The payoff of the informed agent at stage q can typically be expressed as a 1-homogeneous function M of L q+1 − Lq. In a game with n stages, the informed agent will therefore chose the martingale L n that maximizes the M -variation. Under a mere continuity hypothesis on M , we prove in this paper that L n will converge to a continuous martingale of maximal variation. This limit is independent of M . JEL Classification Numbers: G14, C72, C73, D44.
Introduction
Brownian motion is omnipresent in finance analysis. Its appearance in the price dynamic is often explained exogenously. Bachelier was the first to use a Brownian motion to model the price evolution even before its precise definition by Einstein and Wiener. The first sentence in his thesis [Bachelier (1900) ] illustrates quite well this kind of explanation: "The influences that determines the price variations on the stock market are uncountable, past, present or even future expected events, having often nothing to do with the stock market have repercussion on the prices."
Aside this exogenous explanation, there could also be a strategic reason for its appearance: Institutionals have clearly a better access to information on the market than other agents: they are better skilled to analyze the flow of information and in some cases they are even part of the board of directors of the firms whom they are trading the shares. So, institutionals are better informed and this informational advantage is known publicly. As a consequence, each of their moves on the markets is analyzed by the other agents to extract its informational content. If informed agents act naively, taking moves that depend deterministically on their information, they will completely reveal their information to the other agents, and doing so, they 0 The main ideas of this paper were developed during my stay at the Cowles Foundation for research in Economics at Yale university. I am very thankfull to all the members of the Cowles foundation for their hospitality. I would like to thank John Geanakoplos and Pradeep Dubey for fruitful discussions.
will lose their strategic advantage for the future. The only way to take benefit of the information without revealing it to fast is to introduce a noise on their moves: this comes to select random moves with lotteries that depend on their information. The main idea in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003) ] is that the noises introduced by the informed agents in the day after day transactions will generate a Brownian motion. To illustrate this idea, [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003) ] analyzes the interactions between two asymmetrically informed market makers.
1.1. The game G n (P ). The game considered there is as follows: Two market makers are trading a risky asset R against a numéraire N .
Asymmetry of information: At the beginning of the game, market maker 1, hereafter referred to as player 1 (P1), receives a private message M concerning the risky asset. The message M can be either a good news G or a bad news B. The a priori probability that M = G is P . Market maker 2 (P2) knows that player 1 got the message and and also knows P , but he does not observe M .
Liquidation value: The message M will be publicly revealed at a future date T, say at the next shareholder meeting. The price L of R at that date is called the liquidation value of R. It will depend on M . We considered in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003) ] the case L(G) = 1 and L(B) = 0. The liquidation value of N is independent of M and is fixed to be 1.
Trading mechanism: In the game G n (P ), there are n trading periods before date T . As market makers, P1 and P2 have to post, at period q (q = 1, . . . , n), a price p n 1,q and p n 2,q . We suppose that at each period, the choice of p n 1,q and p n 2,q is made simultaneously and independently by the players based on their prior observations and their private information. It is then publicly announced.
Since market regulations stipulates explicitly that the bid ask spread by market makers has to be small, we toke it to be 0 and, therefore, only one price per market maker has to be considered.
The price p posted by a market maker is a commitment to sell or buy a limited amount -say one share-of R in counterpart of p units of N . On the markets, if a trader wants to trade more than this limited amount, it will be at negotiated price. We do not allow for such out of the counter transactions in our model.
Clearly, if p n 1,q = p n 2,q , a trader will see a possibility of arbitrage, and he will buy at the lowest price the maximal number -one-of shares R to sell it immediately at the highest price. To simplify the analysis-this will lead to a zero sum game-, instead of considering two different transactions with an external trader, we considered only one transaction between the market makers: if p n 1,q = p n 2,q , one unit of R goes from the lowest pricing market maker to the highest pricing one in counterpart of a common price in Numéraire that was fixed in our initial model to be the maximal price. (Other choices of the common price would have led to the same results).
So, let y R q and z R q denote the numbers of R shares in P1 and P2's portfolios after the q-th trading period, and similarly, let y N q and z N q denote the numbers of N shares. Then the above described trading mechanism can be summarized by the following formulas, where y q := (y We assume in this model that the initial endowments y 0 and z 0 are large enough so as to avoid situations where one player ran out of R or of N . The constraints y q ≥ 0 and z q ≥ 0 are therefore not binding and are ignored in the model. . Since y 0 and z 0 are initially fixed, the liquidation values of the initial portfolios are constants that can be subtracted from player's utilities without affecting their behavior in the game. This turns out to be equivalent to assume y 0 = z 0 = (0, 0), allowing for negative entries in the portfolios. With that hypothesis, we get clearly y n = −z n and the game G n (P ) is then a zero sum game.
This conclude the depiction of G n (P ). In [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003)], G n (P ) is proved to have a value V n (P ) and a full description of optimal behavior strategies is given. The main result there concerns the asymptotic of the price dynamic at equilibrium as n goes to ∞. More precisely, let Π n be the continuous time representation of the process p ] is the greatest integer less or equal to a. Then, if the players are using their optimal strategies, Π n converges in finite dimensional distribution to a process Π (i.e. for all finite set J ⊂ [0, 1], the random vectors (Π n t ) t∈J converges in distribution to (Π t ) t∈J ). Furthermore, Π is fully described there: it is a martingale on a Brownian filtration referred to hereafter as the continuous martingale of maximal variation corresponding to the distribution µ of the liquidation value L (L = 1 with probability P and 0 with probability 1 − P ).
So, the unique exogenous random event in G n (P ) is the toss of a (biased) coin to select the message. To play optimally, the players have then to introduce mixed moves and all these random moves generate in the limit a Brownian motion, which appears therefore for strategic reasons in the price dynamic. Let ∆ be the set of probability distributions on (R, B R ), where B R is the Borel tribe on R. In the sequel, if µ ∈ ∆, we will use the notation L ∼ µ to indicate that the random variable L is µ distributed. We also write µ L p for X L p where X ∼ µ, and we set ∆ p := {µ ∈ ∆ : µ L p < ∞} and ∆
is the game where a lottery selects initially L ∼ µ. P1 is then privately informed of L but P2 gets no information: he only knows µ. The game follows then exactly as in G n (P ).
In [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2002)], we can prove that, for µ ∈ ∆ 1 , the game G n (µ) has a value V n (µ) and we also characterize the optimal strategies of both players.
To describe the asymptotic of Π n , we need to introduce the following notations: Let Z be a gaussian random variable: Z ∼ N (0, 1). For µ ∈ ∆, as it is well known there is a unique right continuous increasing function
, where F N and F µ are the cumulative distribution functions of N (0, 1) and µ and where F −1 µ (y) := inf{s : F µ (s) > y}. Let B be a standard one dimensional Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω, A, P, (G t ) t≥0 ). If µ ∈ ∆ 1 + , the martingale Π µ t := E[f µ (B 1 )|G t ] will be referred to as the continuous martingales of maximal variation of final distribution µ. This terminology will be justified in section 3.8.
The main result in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2002) ] is that, at equilibrium in G n (µ), Π n converges in finite dimensional distribution to Π µ , as n → ∞.
So given the distribution µ, we have the explicit asymptotic distribution of the price dynamic. Observe that since B is Markovian, Π µ t is a function g(B t , t). Since f µ is increasing, g(x, t) is increasing in x, even strictly increasing for t < 1 whenever f µ is not a constant. Finally, Π µ is a martingale, and therefore g must satisfy the heat equation and with Itô's formula, we get dΠ µ t = h(B t , t)dB t , where h(x, t) := ∂ ∂x g(x, t). In turn, since g is strictly increasing in x, B t is an increasing function of Π µ t , and h(B t , t) is then a function a of (Π µ t , t). We get in this way a diffusion equation for Π µ : dΠ µ t = a(Π µ t , t)dB t So, the above theory not only justifies the appearance of the Brownian motion in the price dynamics, but it also stipulates a class of dynamics.
My conviction is that this class of dynamics contains the right models for the price evolution on the stock market.
Are there statistical evidences to sustain such an assertion? Well, indirectly, since when µ is a log normal distribution, the corresponding process Π µ follows then the Black and Scholes dynamic, which is currently one of the most used dynamic in finance for price modeling. Bachelier's dynamic is also included in this class as the particular case corresponding to a normal distribution µ .
Aside this statistical argument, there is also theoretical justifications for this class of dynamics. The appearance of continuous martingales of maximal variation in G n (µ) is not accidental, due to some particular details in G n (µ). As I aim to prove in this paper, this appearance is on the contrary quite universal and independent of the model.
1.3.
The game Γ n (µ). To support this assertion, we analyze in this paper a generalized game G n (µ), referred to as Γ n (µ), where two asymmetrically informed agents, not necessarily market makers, are trading R against N using an abstract trading device T .
An abstract trading mechanism T is simply a game characterized by two action sets endowed with a σ-algebra (I, I) and (J, J ), (we will assume that finite sets in I or J are measurable) and by an outcome function
which is measurable from (I × J ) to the Borelean tribe of R 2 . If the players play (i, j), A ij and B ij represent the respective numbers of R and N shares P1 receives from P2. ( Typically one is positive an the other negative).
So, in the generalized Γ n (µ), at trading period q (q = 1, . . . , n), the players select an action pair (i q , j q ) independently of each others, based on their prior observations and private information. Actions are then made public and the portfolios are then incremented: y q = y q−1 + T (i q , j q ) and z q = z q−1 − T (i q , j q ). T could clearly represent any bargaining mechanism or auction procedure, actions being then strategies in these mechanisms.
A particular example is the bid ask version of our previous game: At each period both market makers post a bid b q and an ask a q , with b q ≤ a q ≤ b q (1 + ), where the second constraint represent the limit on the spread imposed by the market regulator. In this case, i q = (b 1,q , a 1,q ), j q = (b 2,q , a 2,q ), and A iq,jq = 1 1 b1,q>a2,q − 1 1 b2,q>a1,q and B iq,jq = 1 1 b2,q>a1,q b 2,q − 1 1 b1,q>a2,q b 1,q .
In the generalized game Γ n (µ), players are not posting prices any more, so what is the price process in this case? One possible definition of the price of R at period q could be − Bi q ,jq Ai q ,jq , but this definition would lead to technical problems in case A iq,jq = 0. Another possibility, adopted in this paper, is to define the price L q as the price at which P2 would agree to trade with another uninformed player:
We prove in theorem 1 that under very general and natural hypotheses on T , the continuous version Π
of the price process L q at equilibrium in Γ n (µ) converges in finite distribution to Π µ . So the asymptotic distribution of the price process is basically independent of the exchange mechanism.
1.4. A sketch of the proof. The proof of this result presented here relies on ingredients that could also appear in many other financial models of incomplete information, even non zero sum games, and this let me hope that the appearance of continuous martingales of maximal variation is not limited to the zero sum games analyzed in this paper.
The first ingredient of the proof is that in an n-period game, the informed player may decide to link or not his actions at stage q with his private information. He controls in this way the martingale
, and where L n q is the expected value of L given the public information F q after stage q. The martingale L n belongs thus to M n (µ): the set of martingales of length n + 1 with µ-distributed final value. We can then see the maximization problem P1 faces as a two stage problem: He first chooses a martingale L n ∈ M n (µ) and he then picks his action i q at stage q as a function of (L n k ) k≤q . The second ingredient is that when replying to such a strategy of player 1, the uninformed player is assumed to know the strategy to which he replies. So, to compute the max min of the game, we may assume that, when playing stage q, player 2 has observed L n k for k < q. Therefore, when choosing i q (L As proved in section 2.3, the optimal martingale L n is thus the one in M n (µ) that maximizes
The conditions on the trading mechanism T are presented in the next section. One of them referred to as Invariance with respect to the risk-less part of the risky asset implies in particular that for all constant β, for all random variable L,
The second part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the martingales
We prove in theorem 9 that under a continuity and a homogeneity condition on M , any sequence of maximizing martingales L n converge to the continuous martingale of maximal variation corresponding to µ. This limit is thus independent of M . This result relies on a central limit theorem.
The hypothesis on the trading mechanism called invariance with respect to the Numéraire scale indicates that V 1 fulfills the required homogeneity property and theorem 9 can thus be applied to prove our results on Γ n (µ).
2.
The main result on Γ n (µ) 2.1. Strategies Γ n (µ). Let us first start by defining strategies in Γ n (µ). A mixed strategy for P2 in Γ 1 (µ) is a probability distribution τ on (J, J ). However, since A ij and B ij are a priori unbounded, we have to restrict a little bit this definition. Let ∆(J) be the set of probability distributions τ on (J, J ) such that,
For τ ∈ ∆(J), we set: A iτ := J A ij dτ (j) and B iτ := J B ij dτ (j). In the same way, we define ∆(I) and, for σ ∈ ∆(I), A σ,j and B σ,j .
A
In the same way, a strategy σ in Γ n (µ) is a sequence (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) of ∆(I)-valued transition probabilities σ q : (R×H q−1 , B R ×H q−1 ) → (I, I). S n will denote hereafter the set of P1's strategies.
With Tulcea theorem, a triplet (µ, σ, τ ) will induce a unique probability
Still the payoff function could be undefined in general for integrability reasons and we have to restrict our notion of strategy. The intergrability problem can be illustrated as follows: suppose that τ 2 is just a function of j 1 so that B i2τ2(j1) , is a finite function of j 1 , but it could fail to be integrable with respect to τ 1 .
This leads us to the definition of admissible strategy: A strategy τ is said admissible if for every history h 1 ∈ I n , the probability π
is such that for all q, the random variables |A iq,jq | and |B iq,jq | have finite expectation with respect to π
will denote the set of P2's admissible strategies.
B iq,jq ] are the expected R and N quantities in y n given that player 1 played h 1 . These are finite measurable functions of h 1 . Let us now write formally the payoff in Γ n (µ). Notice that y n is independent on L conditionally to h 1 , since P2's moves depend on h 1 but not on L. Therefore, with expectations taken with respect to π (µ,σ,τ ) , and assuming the integrability of Ly R n + y N n , we could write:
(1)
Observing the last formula, the best player 1 can do to reply to τ is to play a history h 1 (L) depending on L, that solves the problem:
Optimal solution could fail to exist, but measurable -solution exist. Therefore a strategy τ guarantees E µ [φ n τ (L)] to P2. As supremum of a family of affine functions of L, φ n τ (L) is a convex l.s.c. function from R to R∪{∞} and is therefore measurable. Since µ ∈ ∆ 1 , we also have:
Notice that there could be integrability problems in equation (1) in general and it could be the case that E[Ly 
finite. This remark leads us to define the payoff function
This definition of the payoff could still be undetermined for some pairs of strategies. However, if E µ [φ n τ (L)] < ∞, then the payoff function g n (µ, σ, τ ) is possibly equal to − ∞, but there is never indeterminacy, whatever the strategy σ is.
The minimal amount player 2 can guarantee is
A strategy σ is admissible for player 1, if, for all admissible strategy τ :
be the set of admissible strategies for P1.
A strategy σ ∈ S adm n
A strategy σ is optimal if it guarantees V n (µ).
It is always true that V n (µ) ≤ V n (µ). When equality holds, the game Γ n (µ) is said to have a value
If the game has a value, and if σ * and τ * are optimal strategies, then (σ * , τ * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Conversely, if (σ * , τ * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game, then the game has a value and σ * and τ * are optimal strategies.
The hypotheses on the trading mechanism.
Let us first present the hypotheses we will make on the trading mechanism T . The abstract trading device T could clearly be used to trade other shares than R and N . The idea of the first hypothesis is simply that if T is used to trade R against the dollar, it will lead to the same transactions in value as if was used to trade R against the cent. This means that the same number of R shares would be exchanged in both cases, but the number of cents given in counterpart in the second case would be a hundred times the number of dollars given in the first case. Clearly, the players will not use the same actions when trading in dollars or in cents. Instead, there is a translation rule that maps the the actions in dollar to the actions in cents. This leads us to the following hypothesis: H1: Invariance with respect with the numéraire scale. ∀α > 0, there exist measurable one to one mappings ψ 1 : I → I and ψ 2 : J → J such that ∀i, j :
In the original game G n (µ), where the actions were prices p 1 , p 2 , the mappings ψ 1 and ψ 2 corresponding to α would simply be defined by
The next hypothesis is also quite natural for the trading device T : consider a risky asset R which consists of a basket of one share of the risky asset R and one bill of $100. The hypothesis H2 requires that trading R against the dollar with T will lead to the same trade in value as trading R against the dollar: more precisely, we require that the number a of exchanged R and R shares is the same in both cases, but the counterpart in dollar for R is just the counterpart for R plus a · $100. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
H2: Invariance with respect to the risk-less part of the risky asset. ∀β ∈ R, there exist measurable one to one mappings ψ 1 : I → I and ψ 2 : J → J such that ∀i, j :
In a trading mechanism based on prices such as in G n (µ), the translation maps ψ i consist of increasing prices by β. Clearly the bid ask version of G n (µ) also satisfies H1 and H2. We present in section 2.4 a canonical way to obtain trading mechanisms satisfying these hypotheses.
We will not deal in this paper with the technical question of existence of the value for Γ n (p), so that we just assume it in the next hypothesis.
H3: Existence of the value. For all µ ∈ ∆ 1 , for all n, the game Γ n (µ) has a value V n (µ) and both players have optimal strategies in this game.
The next hypothesis is that there exists a situation where player 1 can take benefit of his information. This hypothesis is not insignificant: it means in particular that P2 is not free to avoid trading with the more informed player 1.
H4: Positive value of information. ∃µ ∈ ∆ 2 : V 1 (µ) > 0. H5: Continuity of V 1 . There exists p ∈ [1, 2[ and A ∈ R such that, if X and Y are two random variables on the same probability space with respective distributions µ and ν, then
This last hypothesis will be in particular satisfied with p = 1 if ∀i, j :
We are now ready to state our main theorem concerning Γ n : Theorem 1. Under H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, and for a fixed µ in ∆ 2 , consider a sequence (σ n , τ n ), where ∀n, (σ n , τ n ) is an equilibrium in Γ n (µ), and let L n be the price process in this game, defined as L
This theorem will be proved in the next sections. As a remark, let us observe that the game G n (P ) where players have to post prices in a discrete grid fails to fulfill H1 since the size of the grid is fixed and independent of the scale of numéraire. This game was analyzed in [De Meyer, Marino (2005) ] and indeed it does not display the same asymptotic for the price process.
2.3. The a posteriori martingale. In this section we show that the choice of a strategy for player 1 turns out to be a choice of the optimal rate of revelation. The revelation process, represented by the posterior martingale must be optimal in the maximization problem (4) here below.
If Y is a random variable on a probability space (Ω, A, P ) and if H ⊂ A is a σ-algebra, the probability distribution of Y will be denoted [Y ] , and the conditional distribution of Y given H will be [Y |H]. We will also write
is an H-measurable random variable 1 . Let W n (µ) be the set of pairs (F, X) where F := (F q ) q=0,...,n+1 is a filtration on 1 The set ∆ of probability measures on R may be endowed with the weak*-topology: the weakest topology such that φg : µ → Eµ[g] is continuous, for all continuous bounded function g : R → R. If Y is a random variable on a probability space (Ω, A, P ) and if H ⊂ A is a σ-algebra, the conditional distribution [Y |H] can then be seen as a measurable map from (Ω, H) to (∆, B ∆ ) where B ∆ denotes the Borel σ-algebra on ∆ corresponding to the weak*-topology. Let ∆ 2 r be the
, where gn(x) := min(x 2 , n).) We next prove that the restriction of V 1 to ∆ 2 r is continuous: If {µn} n∈N ⊂ ∆ 2 r converges weakly to µ, then, according Skorokhod embeding theorem, there exists a sequence Xn of random variables with Xn ∼ µn that converges a.s. to X ∼ µ. Since Xn − X L 2 ≤ 2r, we conclude that |Xn − X| p is a uniformly integrable sequence (p < 2), and thus Xn − X L p → 0, implying with H5 that
is measurable as composition of measurable functions. a probability space, and X = (X q ) q=0,...,n+1 is an F-martingale X whose n + 1-th value X n+1 is µ-distibuted. For (F, X) ∈ W n (µ), we define V n (F, X) as:
Let us also define V n (µ) as
Proof: Given (F, X) ∈ W n (µ) on a probability space (Ω, A, P ), we have to prove that P1 can guarantee V n (F, X) in Γ n (µ). At the initial stage of Γ n (µ), nature selects a µ distributed random variable L and informs P1 of its choice. We can clearly assume that nature uses the probability space (Ω, A, P ) as lottery, and sets L = X n+1 , since X n+1 ∼ µ. We can also assume that P1 observes the whole space (Ω, A, P 
Proof: We will prove that P1 will not be able to guarantee a higher payoff than V n (µ). Indeed, let σ be an optimal strategy of P1 in Γ n (µ). To reply to σ, P2 may adopt the following strategy: since he knows σ 1 , he may compute the distribution of
, and plays an optimal strategy
, since conditionally to H q−1 , the move j q is independent of L. Therefore, with
With that reply P1's conditional payoff at period q, given H q−1 is the at most
then (H, L) solves the maximization problem (4).
Proof: The first claim follows the two previous lemmas.
Let next assume that the players are playing a pair (σ, τ ) of optimal strategies in Γ n (µ).
Let us then first observe that, for all q, the expectation, conditional to H q , of the sum of the next n − q stage payoffs must clearly be at least V n−q [L|H q ]. Otherwise P1 could deviate from stage q+1 on to an optimal strategy in Γ n−q [L|H q ], obtaining thus a higher payoff against τ than with σ, which is impossible since (σ, τ ) is an equilibrium of the game.
At period q, P2 may compute
. On the event {v q−1 < u q−1 }, P2 could then deviate at stage q with an optimal strategy in Γ 1 [L q |H q−1 ], bringing the expected payoff of that stage to less than v q−1 , that is strictly less than the payoff u q−1 P1 would obtain with τ .
If P2 then follows with an optimal strategy in Γ n−q [L|H q ], the payoff of P1 in the n − q last stages will be less than V n−q [L|H q ], which is, as observed above, less than the payoff P1 gets with the pair (σ,
. Summing up all these inequalities, we get V n (H, L) ≥ g n (µ, σ, τ ) = V n (µ) = V n (µ), and the second assertion is proved.
2.4.
The canonical representation of Γ 1 (µ). The aim of this section is double: on one hand we will derive the properties of V 1 implied by the hypotheses H1, H2. On the other hand, we will provide a generic way to create trading mechanism having these properties.
In the one shot game, a strategy of player 2 is just an element τ of ∆(J), the history h 1 reduces to i, and we get (2) will simply be denoted φ τ in this section. It becomes then: φ τ (L) = sup i∈I LA i,τ + B iτ . We get therefore:
where Φ is the set of l.s.c. convex functions φ such that φ ≥ φ τ for some τ ∈ ∆(J).
Notice that in this formula, we wrote min instead of inf, since the infimum is reached at the optimal strategy τ which exists according to H3.
Lemma 5. Φ is a convex set of convex functions.
Proof: Indeed, at fixed L, the map τ → LA i,τ + B iτ is linear in τ , and therefore, as supremum of linear maps, the map τ → φ τ (L) is convex. Therefore, if φ, φ ∈ Φ, if λ, λ ≥ 0, with λ+λ = 1, then the function φ = λφ+λ φ is clearly convex u.s.c. and, if φ ≥ φ τ and φ ≥ φ τ , then φ ≥ λφ τ + λ φ τ ≥ φ τ , where τ = λτ + λ τ . Hence, φ belongs to Φ which results to be a convex set.
Let us now look at the implications of H1 and H2:
Proof: For α > 0, let ψ 1 and ψ 2 be translation mappings corresponding to α in H1. Let τ ∈ ∆(J), and let τ α be the τ 's image probability on J by ψ 2 : τ α is the probability distribution of ψ 2 (j) when j is τ distributed. Then, ∀i ∈ I :
Therefore, since ψ 1 is one to one,
So, if φ belongs to Φ, there exists τ such that φ ≥ φ τ . Therefore φ α ≥ φ τα , and hence φ α also belongs to Φ.
For β ∈ R, let now ψ 1 and ψ 2 be translation mappings corresponding to β in H2. Defining τ β as the τ 's image probability on J by ψ 2 , we get now ∀i ∈ I :
, and, if φ belongs to Φ, there exists τ such that φ ≥ φ τ . Therefore φ β ≥ φ τ β , and hence φ β also belongs to Φ.
Lemma 7. The function V 1 [·] is 1-homogeneous, positive, and invariant by translation by a constant. In other words, for all random variable X, ∀α ≥ 0, ∀β ∈ R:
Proof: Let us first prove ii): The map φ ∈ Φ → φ β is clearly one to one. Therefore:
Let us next prove iv) for a strictly positive α. Then the map φ ∈ Φ → φ α is clearly one to one. Therefore:
With X = 0 and α = 2, we get thus
This implies in particular that iv) holds also when α = 0.
Next, with ii), we get,
and iii) is proved. Finally, due to Jensen's inequality: for all φ ∈ Φ :
One easy consequence of iii) is that Φ is a set of positive functions. Indeed, for all φ ∈ Φ :
Given a convex set Φ of finite positive convex functions on R, stable for the α and β transforms (i.e. ∀a > 0, ∀β ∈ R : φ α , φ β ∈ Φ, whenever φ ∈ Φ.), there exists a transaction mechanism T satisfying H1, H2 such that
In this mechanism I = R, J = Φ, and for all x ∈ R, φ ∈ Φ, A x,φ := φ (x), B x,φ := φ(x) − φ (x) · x, where the derivative φ is the right continuous selection of the sub gradient of φ in case φ is not differentiable.
It is then easy to prove that with ψ 1 (x) := αx and ψ 2 (φ) := φ α , the hypothesis H1 is satisfied. Similarly, with ψ 1 (x) := x + β and ψ 2 (φ) := φ β , H2 is satisfied.
Based on the previous properties of V 1 , theorem 1 becomes a particular case of theorem 9 hereafter. The proof of this theorem will thus be postponed to section 3.2.
Martingales of maximal variation
3.1. The maximal covariation. In this section, we solve an auxiliary optimization problem that will be quite useful to deal with the martingale optimization problem analyzed in this part. Let µ be a probability distribution on R and Z a N (0, 1) random variable on a probability space (Ω, A, P ). As it is well known there is a unique right continuous increasing function f µ such that f µ (Z) ∼ µ. Namely f µ (x) = F 
Proof: Let us first prove the result for a measure µ such that µ([0, ∞[) = 1. Let X be a µ-distributed random variable. Since µ ∈ ∆ 1 + , XZ is in L 1 , and with Fubini-Tonelli theorem
Now observe that X and f µ (Z) have the same distribution. Therefore
and we infer that 
, and assertion 1) follows for µ.
Let next {X n } n∈N be a sequence of µ-distributed random variables such that E[X n Z] converges to α(µ). Then ∞ 0 E[h(X n , Z, c)]dc converges to 0, and, since h(X n , Z, c) ≥ 0, we conclude that h(X n (ω), Z(ω), c) converges to 0 in P ⊗λ-measure on the measure space (Ω × R, A ⊗ B R , P ⊗ λ), where λ is the Lebesgue measure and B R is the Borelean tribe on R.
As a consequence, there exists a subsequence {X n } n∈N of {X n } n∈N , such that that h(X n (ω), Z(ω), c) converges P ⊗ λ-a.e. to 0. Next
converges P ⊗ λ-a.e. to 0.
Since ∀c:
, c) converges also P ⊗ λ-a.e. to 0, and since l is bounded by 2, we conclude with Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem that for all K < ∞:
where a ∧ b is the minimum of the two numbers a and b. Now
Since X n and f µ (Z) are µ-distributed, the first and the third terms are equal and are just a function g(K). So, ∀K, lim sup n→∞
1 , we get lim K→∞ g(K) = 0, and we conclude therefore that X n converges to f µ (Z) in L 1 . We thus have proved that any maximizing sequence {X n } n∈N (i.e. such that E[X n Z] → α(µ)) contains a sub sequence {X n } n∈N that converges in L 1 to f µ (Z). This implies clearly that any maximizing sequence converges to f µ (Z), in L 1 : Claim 2) of the theorem is proved for µ.
The previous proof can be generalized to a two sided measures µ, working separately on the positive and negative part of the random variables:
, the function h to be considered here contains now two non negative terms corresponding respectively to the positive and negative parts of X and F µ (Z). ). W n (µ) was defined in section 2.3 as the set of pairs (F, X) where F := (F q ) q=0,...,n+1 is a filtration on a probability space, and X = (X q ) q=0,...,n+1 is an F-martingale X whose n + 1-th value X n+1 is µ-distibuted. Observe that if µ ∈ ∆ 2 and (F,
0 , and we may therefore
Since we only will deal in this paper with Lipschitz M in L p -norm for p < 2, we refer to footnote 1 on page 8 for a proof of the measurability of M [X q+1 − X q |F q ].
Let us next define
The main result of this part is
and α(µ) defined as in theorem 8, we have:
Furthermore, if ρ > 0 and if, for all n, (
converges in finite dimensional distribution to the continuous martingale of maximal variation Π µ defined in the introduction.
This theorem justifies our terminology when referring to Π µ as the continuous martingale of maximal variation corresponding to µ.
With
is just the L 1 -variation of the martingale X and we recover here Mertens and Zamir's result on the maximal variation of a bounded martingale [Mertens, Zamir (1976) The last theorem implies also theorem 1. Proof of theorem 1: Indeed, due to ii) in lemma 7, we have for all variable X:
, and thus also, if F is a σ-algebra:
n (F, X). Since, iv) in lemma 7 indicates that V 1 satisfies the first condition of theorem 9, H5 indicates that V 1 fullfils the second one and H4 indicates that ρ > 0, theorem 1 follows then from theorem 4. As a byproduct, we also get that lim n→∞
The six remaining sections of the paper are devoted to the proof of theorem 9. We first provide an upper bound for M in the next section that leads to an upper bound for V M n in the next one. We will then conclude in section 3.6 that ρ·α(µ) dominates the lim sup of
, using a central limit theorem for martingales presented in section 3.5.
In section 3.7, we prove that ρ · α(µ) is the lim inf of
, and in section 3.8, we prove the convergence of the Π n to Π µ . Notice that the case ρ = 0 is trivial in theorem 9, since then M [µ] ≤ 0 for all µ in ∆ 2 0 , and thus the constant martingale X q = E[X n+1 ], for all q ≤ n and X n+1 ∼ µ will be optimal in the maximization problem (7), and so V M n (µ) = 0. In the sequel, we therefore assume ρ > 0.
As a remark, observe that the hypothesis p < 2 in ii) of theorem 9 could not be weakened in p ≤ 2. A counterexample of this is given at the end of section 3.6 3.3. An upper bound for M . On a probability space (Ω, A, P ), for q ≥ 1 and r > 0, let B q r (Ω, A, P ) be the set B q r (Ω, A,
* (Ω, A, P ) be defined as:
(Ω, A, P ), with A, ρ and p as in theorem 9 and p such that
* (Ω, A, P )}, and therefore B(X) just depends on the distribution [X] . In other words, if [X] = [X ], then B(X) = B(X ), even if X and X are defined on different probability spaces. We will therefore abuse the notations and write B[X] instead of B(X).
(Ω, A, P )).
3) For all X ∈ L (Ω, A, P )). Since (
(Ω, A, P ) does not belong to C, we can separate {Z} and C in L 2 (Ω, A, P ) by a separating vector Y : . Since E[X] = 0, we also have
). Due to property ii) in theorem 9, we get:
ρ , it follows from claim 1) that the first term is bounded by λ. The second one is bounded by
and the lemma is proved.
An upper bound for
, and we will therefore concentrate our attention on V B n (F, X). Next lemma presents E[B[X q+1 − X q |F q ]] as the result of an optimization problem.
Let F 1 ⊂ F 2 be two σ-algebras on a probability space (Ω,
2) If there exists in L 2 (Ω, F 2 , P )) a random variable U that is independent of σ(F 1 , X) and taking the values 1 and − 1 with probability 1/2 then
* (F 2 |F 1 )}. To prove the reverse inequality, we just have to prove that, ∀ > 0, there exists a measurable map φ :
The existence of such a measurable map follows from the fact that the set D of measure µ with finite support in Q and rational weights is a countable dense subset of ∆ 2 for the L 2 -topology: For all > 0, there exists thus a measurable partition {A n } n∈N of ∆ 2 and a sequence {ξ n } n∈N ⊂ D such that ∀µ ∈ ∆ 2 , the measure µ := n 1 1 µ∈An ξ n satisfies ∃X, X such that X ∼ µ and X ∼ µ with X−X L 2 ≤ δ := /(1 + 2ρ). For all n there also exists θ n :
We next turn to claim 2): Just observe that if Y ∈ B * (F 2 |F 1 ), then Y := E[Y |X] also belongs to B * (F 2 |F 1 ) and has thus the property that
. Now, observe that
Finally, let Y be defined as Y := Y + ρ 2 − θ 2 U , since U is independent of σ(F 1 , X), and since Y is measurable on this σ-algebra, we get obviously
and claim 2) then follows from claim 1).
Let us now use this lemma to compute V M n (F, X) for a pair (F, X) ∈ W n (µ) defined on a probability space (Ω, A, P ). Let us first enlarge this space obtaining a new one (Ω , A , P ) where A may be seen as a sub σ-algebra of A , P and P coincide on A and where there is a system of n independent random variables (U q ) q=1,··· ,n , independent of A, with P (U q = 1) = P (U q = −1) = 1/2. Consider next the filtration F defined by F q := σ(F q , U k , k ≤ q). X is then also a martingale on F and
We will denote B * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ) the set of F -adapted processes Y such that for all q = 1, . . . , n:
, we may apply claim 2) of last lemma to get
and therefore
For a given Y ∈ B * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ), let S q be defined as S 0 := 0, S q := S q−1 + Y q . Observe then that S is an F -martingale. We will denote S (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ) the set of F -martingale S whose increments S q+1 − S q belong to B * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F q |F q−1 ), for all q, and such that S 0 = 0. The last formula becomes then
Let us make two comments on the last formula: the quantity V M n (F , X) depends on the laws [X q+1 − X q |F q ] which are intimately related to the filtration F. The bound we found in the last formula just depends on the laws [X q+1 −X q |X 1 , . . . , X q ]. Therefore, if we create a martingaleX on another filtration G with the same law as X -we call this procedure the embedding of X in the filtration G-, the right hand side of last inequality can equivalently be evaluated onX.
The second comment is that we will have to deal with
, and will then
Since the increments of S have a conditional variance equal to ρ 2 , Sn √ n will be approximatively normally distributed, due to a central limit theorem for martingales. We need however precise bounds for this approximation. These bounds are provided in the next section which is in fact the crux point of the argument. We embed there both martingales
and X in a Brownian filtration.
3.5. The embedding in the Brownian filtration. Let B be a Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω 0 , A 0 , P 0 ) and let G be the natural filtration of B. Skorokhod rose the following question: Given a probability distribution µ ∈ ∆ p , is there a G-stopping time θ such that B θ ∼ µ? To avoid trivial uninteresting solutions to this problem, one further require that E[θ p 2 ] < ∞. It is well known that Skorokhod's problem has a solution for all µ ∈ ∆ p 0 (see for instance [Azéma, Yor (1979) ]) and we will denote θ µ one of these solutions.
We also will need the following fact: For all p > 1, there exist two non negative constants c p and C p , called the Burkholder Davis Gundy constants (see [Burkholder (1973) ]), such that, for all G-stopping times τ ≥ τ :
In the particular case p = 2, we have c 2 = C 2 = 1.
Lemma 12. Let R = (R q ) q:=0,...,n be a martingale with R n ∈ L p 0 , then there is an increasing sequence of stopping times {τ q } q:=0,...,n such that E[τ where θ µ is a solution of µ-Skorokhod's problem for the Brownian motion B . This mapping can be chosen measurable from R q+1 to (Ω 0 , A 0 ), and define τ q+1 := τ q +θ(R 0 , . . . ,R q ). ThenR q+1 −R q = B τq+1 − B τq = B θ (R0,...,Rq) . Therefore
We then conclude that R andR have the same laws. Next since c p · E[θ(R 0 , . . . ,R q )
we conclude by induction that E[τ
We are now ready to start the embedding procedure. Let us consider (F , X) ∈ W n (µ) and S ∈ S * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ), as in the last section. +θ(R 0 , . . . ,R q ), τ q+
.
It is convenient to define also τ n+1 as τ n+1 = τ n+
The processR has the same distribution as R, is a G τq -martingale and the distribution ofR n − B τn is clearly N (0, n ), in particular
For = 0, we have just the embedding of the lemma. The advantage of introducing > 0 is that this will allow to embed X also: Let Z ∼ N (0, ). There exists a measurable function f q :
[f q (r 0 , . . . , r q , x 0 , . . . ,
Define thenX q := f q (R 0 , . . . ,R q ,X 0 , . . . ,X q−1 , B τq−1+ − B τq−1 ). Clearly (R, S) and (R,X) have the same distribution and (R,X) is a G τq -martingale. In order to obtain our central limit result forR n , we will prove hereafter that τ n is close to be a constant stopping time, which indicates that B τn follows approximately a normal distribution.
] is the greatest integer less or equal to a.
2
q=1 (τ q − τ q−1 ). Then, since S ∈ S * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ), we get τ 0 = , and
where
The process Q = (Q s ) s=0,...n is clearly a G τs -martingale starting at 0. 
We claim next that
This follows at once from a recursive use of the relation:
that holds for all x in R, whenever Y is a centered random variable: Indeed,
Sincep ≤ 2, straightforward computation indicates that, for fixed a, the function g(x) := ||x + a|p
, as announced and inequality (13) follows.
], we also have
Lp , and thus
. Therefore, we get with Burkholder Davis
Gundy inequality, and since S ∈ S * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ):
n −p , and, with (13), we conclude
Therefore, with (12), we get:
and claim 2) is proved. We next prove claim 3):
The first term is bounded by claim 2), and the second one by claim 1) .
An upper bound for lim sup
Let us consider (F , X) ∈ W n (µ). According to (10), we have:
For S ∈ S * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ), let us define R n := Sn ρ √ n and let us embed (X, R) in the Brownian filtration, as done in the last section, for > 0.
Then
Claim 3) for t = 1 in lemma 13 yields
With (11), we get then
where α(µ) was defined in theorem 8. Since this holds for all > 0 and all S ∈ S * (ρ,4A+ρ) (F ), we conclude that for all (F , X) ∈ W n (µ):
Since p > 2, and since the constant κ in lemma 13 is independent of n, we thus have proved:
Theorem 14. Under the hypotheses of theorem 9,
We will prove in the next section that ρ · α(µ) is the limit of
as n increases to ∞. To conclude this section, we give here an example to illustrate that p must be strictly less than 2 in hypothesis ii) of theorem 9 in order to get the result: Clearly, the function M [µ] := µ L 2 satisfies hypothesis i) of theorem 9, and would also satisfy hypothesis ii) with A = 1 if p = 2 was allowed. For this M , ρ = 1. Let then µ be the probability that assigns a weight 1/2 to + 1 and − 1. Let X n be the unique martingale of length n+1 such that ∀q = 0, . . . , n, |X 
Since for all pair (F , X) ∈ M n (µ), we can write as in (10):
n ] = n, and due to Cauchy Swartz inequality, it comes
and thus
We will provide in this section a sequence (
Using lemma 12, we can construct, for each n, an increasing sequence (τ n q ) q=0,...,n of stopping times on the Brownian filtration G such that Y The argument of lemma 13 can be applied to this sequence of stopping times, replacing ρ by 1, p by 4, by 0 and 4A + ρ by Y L 4 . We obtain in this way:
] converges a.s. to t an n goes to ∞.
Proof: By construction of the sequence τ 
Burkholder Davis Gundy inequality indicates that
The strong law of large numbers indicates that
) converges a.s. to 0, and point 3) follows then from point 1).
We finally conclude
where r n := T n (r) is the image of the process r by the map T n we now define. Let H 2 be the linear space of G-progressively measurable processes a such that
Let also H , we define T n (a) as the simple process
Lemma 16. T n is a linear mapping from H 2 [0,1] to H 2 and,
As a simple process, T n (a) is progressively measurable and
Furthermore, with Jensens inequality: The H 2 norm of the two first terms goes to 0 with n since ψ L ∞ < ∞ and E[τ ,τ n We definedX n in equation (14) with r n := T n (r). We next take benefit of last lemma to prove thatX n is a good approximation of X n .
Lemma 18. 1) lim n→∞ X n n − X n n L 2 = 0.
Proof: Since Itô's integral is isometric from H 2 to L 2 , we get:
H 2 , and claim 1) then follows from last lemma.
We prove now claim 2). With ∆X Therefore and since √ x is concave in x, we get with Jensens inequality: .
Since E[B 2 τ n n ] = 1, we also have
On the other hand, with claim 1) and 2) in lemma 13 and our choice of n we infer that τ 
